|
|
||||||||||
|
Lo Russo v. Brookside Homeowner’s Association, Inc., 17 A.D.3d 323, 793 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2d Dep’t 2005) The owners of property located in a residential subdivision in Westchester County brought suit against their homeowner’s association seeking a judgment declaring that the homeowner’s association failed to comply with a declaration of easements, covenants and restrictions that required, among other things, the maintenance of certain ponds in the subdivision. The Appellate Division, Second Department held that under the “business judgment rule” the homeowner’s association had shown that the decisions of its board of directors were made in good faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the association. City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck and Town Board of the Town of Mamaroneck, 2001 WL 1665463 (N.Y. Sup.), 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 40467(U) The Town of Mamaroneck, due to intense local opposition to the development of an IKEA retail store in a neighboring municipality, enacted what it purported was an innovative and unprecedented local law in the State whereby the Town sought to regulate certain major developments outside its municipal borders and within neighboring municipalities. The local law created a second environmental review process, in addition to the State environmental review process of SEQRA, which required a permit from the Town Board in order to undertake certain projects outside the Town’s borders. The sole issue was whether the requirements of SEQRA had been complied with in the local law’s enactment, as only a short-form EAF had been filled out and a full environmental review had not been conducted. The Supreme Court held that the Town had failed to comply with SEQRA, which required an inquiry into the potential effects of the law on the neighboring municipalities, including social, economic and environmental effects. Whipple v. Trail Properties, Inc., 261 A.D.2d 470, 690 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dep’t 1999) In an action to determine the title to a portion of real property, the Supreme Court rendered partial summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed in part and remanded. After their initial demand for a jury trial was denied on the basis of joinder of equitable causes of action, plaintiffs amended their complaint. After the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to renew the demand, the Appellate Division held that plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial and the subsequent amendment of their complaint did not revive the right. Lerner v. Town Board of the Town of Oyster Bay, 244 A.D.2d 336, 663 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2d Dep’t 1997) After petitioners’ application for a special use permit that would have allowed for the construction of a 116,000 square foot retail warehouse and a 40,000 square foot multiplex theater on a 24-acre parcel of property, then being used as a drive-in movie theater, was denied, on the purported basis of traffic impacts, the petitioners-landowners commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking review of the denial. The Supreme Court annulled the denial and directed the Town Board to grant the Special Use Permit with reasonable conditions, and the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. The record clearly established that six out of seven days of the week the traffic generated would be less than as-of-right development that could occur on the parcel. Further, the court held that petitioners had demonstrated that any traffic generated would have no adverse impact on intersections in the vicinity. It was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion for the special use permit to have been denied and accordingly the denial was properly annulled. Scenic Hudson, Inc. v. Town of Fishkill Town Board, 266 A.D.2d 462, 699 N.Y.S.2d 70 (2d Dep’t 1999) The Town of Fishkill enacted a local law that rezoned a construction company’s property from residential to planned industrial. The landowner argued that the local law had been enacted in violation of SEQRA, as part of an impermissible segmented review of the rezoning. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the local law effectuating the rezoning was enacted in compliance with SEQRA and that the proceeding was properly dismissed by the Supreme Court. DGM Partners-Rye v. City of Rye, 176 A.D.2d 851, 575 N.Y.S.2d 330 (2d Dep’t 1991) The owner of real property which was formerly part of the estate of the family of John Jay challenged the landmarks designation of a carriage house and a portion of land referred to as the “viewway” designated to remain undeveloped so as to preserve a public view of the mansion situated on the property. The owner sought a declaratory judgment that the landmark designation of both aspects of the property constituted unconstitutional takings and were invalid as not meeting the statutory criteria for such designations. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court which determined that the specific chapter of the City Code pursuant to which the designations were made was valid and constitutional. Finding that the subject designations substantially advanced the legitimate State interest of landmark preservation and that the trial evidence disclosed a rational basis for the designations, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the viewway designation was a per se taking, holding that the designation of the viewway did not constitute an uncompensated sight easement and did not amount to a physical invasion of the property. |
||||||||||
| Page
{1}
{2}
{3}
{4}
{5} |
|||||||||||
| |||||||||||