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Shamberg Marwell Davis & Hollis


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Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 94 N.Y.2d 96, 721 N.E.2d 971 (1999),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1735 (2000)

The owner of property that had served as a golf course since 1921, but which was residentially zoned since 1922, challenged the Town’s re-zoning of the property years later to exclusively recreational use, on the ground that the re-zoning resulted in an unconstitutional taking of its property without just compensation. The Court of Appeals effectively limited United States Supreme Court taking jurisprudence and upheld the re-zoning on the basis that re-zoning the property to solely recreational use bore a reasonable relation to legitimate objectives of furthering open space, recreational opportunities and flood control, and substantially advanced those purposes.

Abate v. City of Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 605, 781 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2d Dep’t 2004)
In this “border war” litigation between adjoining municipalities, two related proceedings were brought to prohibit the City of Yonkers from issuing any additional building permits and to invalidate an environmental Findings Statement made by the City Council in 1999 in connection with a commercial development project that involved two “big box” retail stores. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the Supreme Court’s decision which had granted the petition of a neighboring municipality, invalidated the Findings Statement, and directed a supplemental environmental review be conducted. The Appellate Division dismissed the proceeding on the basis that the neighboring municipality not only failed to seek a preliminary injunction, but acquiesced in the construction of the subject shopping center during the course of the litigation, such that the challenged stores had been constructed and were operating at the time the Supreme Court ruled on the merits of the petition, rendering the proceeding moot.

City of New York v. Anglebrook Ltd. Partnership, 58 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1995)
The City of New York brought an action against a golf course developer based upon the City’s contention that the developer’s Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plans (SWPPP) under the State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) were inadequate, and therefore, in violation of the Clean Water Act. The golf course’s designers maintained that plans were in compliance with the law and were, in fact, “state of the art.”
      The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District dismissing the City’s complaint and denying its request for an injunction, for substantially the same reasons as the District Court. The District Court (891 F.Supp. 908) held that: guidelines set forth in the SPDES General Permit were flexible rules requiring applicants to exercise good engineering practices informed by professional judgment and common sense; the SWPPP contained sufficient erosion and sediment controls; the SWPPP provided adequate measures for maintaining stormwater quality; the City failed to prove that stormwater discharged during and after construction would cause or contribute to the contravention of water quality standards for phosphorus and turbidity; and further that the City failed to prove that any deficiencies in the SWPPP would cause irreparable harm to City’s reservoirs or to its drinking water, so as to warrant injunctive relief.

Kamhi v. Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346 (1989)
A developer challenged the validity of a local law conditioning site plan approval for a multifamily residential development on the conveyance of title of a portion of the land to the municipality for use as parkland or the land’s money equivalent. The Court of Appeals held the local law was invalid, as it was in contravention of New York Town Law, which did not provide the authority for planning boards to impose a recreation fee as a condition of site plan approval, and was also not authorized by Municipal Home Rule Law.
      Furthermore, the Court held that the local law did not supersede Town Law, as is permissible in some instances. This case has also served as a landmark decision in determining the validity of municipal impact fees.

Bayswater Realty & Capital Corp. v. Planning Board of Town of Lewisboro, 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560 N.E.2d 1300 (1990)
A developer challenged the planning board’s conditioning of approval of a cluster subdivision plat on the permanent reservation of approximately sixty acres of land as open space and payment of a recreation fee in lieu of setting aside parkland, arguing that the open lands set aside as part of its approved cluster subdivision satisfied any obligation to pay a recreation fee. The Court of Appeals held that the planning board was not precluded from requiring both the permanent reservation of land as open space and the payment of a recreation fee pursuant to the Town Law. The Court found that a planning board’s authority pursuant to Town Law to attach conditions to open lands and to require that a plat show parklands are not mutually exclusive. However, the planning board failed to make the necessary determination that additional recreational land was needed and the matter was therefore remitted to the planning board for further consideration.
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